Greg Detre
@12:00 Tuesday, October 08, 2002
based on his discussions about electronic markets at Dag Stuhl
Goal:
tractable, truthful, one-shot VCG-based mechanism
with no assumptions about preferences
(except private values, free-disposal, no externalities)
VCG =
Vicary-Clarke-Groves
it�s an economic mechanism
2nd price auction
first price auction - sell to highest bidder, make them
pay your bid price, so you shave down your bid price
2nd price auction - one-shot, i.e. everyone bids at the same
time, select highest bidder, but for the second highest bid price
strategy-proof
you can prove a failure of strategy-proofness if you can show that,
given the other agents� preferences etc., you�re better off mis-stating your
own
dominant strategy is to truthfully reveal your value (neither too low
nor too high)